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INTRODUCTION

Construction litigation, although costly and time consuming, is frequently
initiated in Florida.' Seeking damages for latent construction defects, discontented homeowners have customarily instituted actions against the standard construction defendants: the developer, contractor and design professionals.
Historically, these defendants apportioned blame among themselves, seeking contribution and indemnification through separate actions and crossclaims. 2 Re-

*

Editor's Note. This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the best

student Note submitted in the Fall 1984 semester.
1.

FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE S 15.1 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ.

1982).
2. Id. 55 15.5, .8, .25. See, e.g., Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983) (purchasers
sought recovery from developer for collapse of sea wall abutting their lots); Drexel Properties, Inc.
v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (condominium
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cently, however, defendants and private homeowners have attempted to shift
part of the responsibility for construction defects to municipalities. Claiming
reliance on municipal approval of building plans, construction inspection and
grants of certificates of occupancy, construction defendants and homeowners
have successfully joined municipalities in construction suits.
Finding that sovereign immunity was no longer a barrier, two Florida district
courts of appeal have agreed that municipalities can be held liable for negligent
building inspection. 3 However, the Florida Supreme Court, in a lengthy and
confused decision, recently held that municipalities are immune from such actions. 4 Some commentators fear that imposing construction liability on municipalities would turn the government into insurers of private construction.' Yet,
6
others advocate government liability as a remedy to governmental inefficiencies.
This Note will explore the ramifications of municipal liability for negligent
building inspection. Specifically, Part II will trace the abrogation of sovereign
immunity in Florida, while Part III will examine municipal liability under
current Florida law. Part IV will present the ramifications of municipal liability
in Florida construction litigation, and Part V will suggest alternatives to the
current Florida position.
II.

THE ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY

Courts and legal scholars have long called for the abolition of sovereign
immunity. 7 Although characterized as "an anachronism without rational basis," 8
sovereign immunity has deep roots in the common law.9 The original basis of

association sought to recover damages from developer for failing to construct condominium in
accordance with Building Code); Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Concepts, Corp., 373 So.
2d 689 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979) (condominium association sought recovery from architect and contractor for defective roof). Generally the developer claims he relied on the architect and general
contractor and the contractor claims he relied on the architect, engineer, and developer. See, e.g.,
Biscayne Roofing Co. v. Palmetto Fairway Condominium Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1982) (subcontractor was required to indemnify general contractor who in turn was required to
indemnify owner-developer); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973) (general
contractor recovered economic damages he had suffered due to the negligence of the supervising
architect).
3. Manors of Inverrary XII Condominium Ass'n, v. Atreco-Florida, Inc., 438 So. 2d 490
(4th D.C.A. 1983), pet. for rev. dismissed sub noma., Lauderhill v. Manors of Inverrary XII Condominium Ass'n, 450 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1984); Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah,
423 So. 2d 911 (3d D.C.A. 1982), quashed, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
4. Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d at 912, (Fla. 1985).
5. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924) (credited with
helping to begin the trend toward the abolition of sovereign immunity); Mosk, The Many Problems
of Sovereign Immunity, 3 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 7 (1966) (evaluation of groundbreaking legislation and
judicial decisions denying sovereign immunity).
8. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 92 (1961) (Traynor, J., in the decision in which California abolished sovereign immunity).
9. Most commentators agree that sovereign immunity was introduced into the common law
by the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). In Russell, the
plaintiff sued all of the male inhabitants of the County of Devon for damages caused to his wagon
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sovereign immunity is often cited as the empty maxim, "the King can do no
wrong."' 0 However, many sound policy reasons have been asserted in its defense." The justifications stem from the premise that governmental entities are
unique because they engage in activities that are not undertaken by private
individuals.' 2 Opponents of sovereign immunity base their position on the belief
that all victims of wrongful conduct are entitled to relief, even when the perpetrator is the government. 3 This position is advanced by the Florida Constitution, which provides: "The courts shall be open to every person for redress
4
of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.'
A vast majority of states, including Florida, have enacted legislation which
partially waives sovereign immunity. 5 Although statutes have restricted sovereign immunity, judicial exceptions have created new barriers limiting liability
of governmental entities. Judicial treatment of municipal liability for negligent
building inspection illustrates the legal community's ambivalence over sovereign
immunity. Florida courts, which once criticized the rule of sovereign immunity
as harsh, unconstitutional and undemocratic, 6 now express concern over the
7
possible permutations of government liability.1
Traditionally, three major judicial barriers have shielded municipalities from
liability for negligent inspection: the governmental-proprietary distinction, the
by an ill-kept bridge. The House of Lords granted immunity to the men of Devon because of the
lack of a common fund from which to collect the judgment. Id. at 362. For" a historical perspective
of sovereign immunity, see Borchard, supra note 7, at 129, 229.
10. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 244 (T. Codey 3d ed. 1884); Note, Municipal Tort
Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National Survy, 58 WASH. L. REv. 537, 538
(1983).
11. This note will focus on municipal tort immunity. The traditional justifications fbr municipal immunity are: (1) a municipality derives no pecuniary benefit from the exercise of public
functions; (2) many of the activities municipalities perform are so dangerous that no private industry
would undertake the risk; (3) unlike a private corporation, a municipality cannot just cease to
perform the function if it cannot afford the costs since the function may be necessary for the public
welfare; and (4) municipal liability will drain the public treasury, diverting money from needed
public services. Municipalities will thus be forced to increase taxes. See generally Little, Con Article
X, § 13, In Defense of the 1968 Constitution's Statement on Sovereign Immunity, 52 FLA. BJ. 666 (1978)
(arguments in favor of retaining some degree of sovereign immunity); Spence, Pro Article X, § 13,
Abolition of Sovereign Immunity in Florida: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 FLA. B.J. 655 (1978)
(arguments for the abolition of sovereign immunity).
12. See Degrazia & Oldani, Governmental Immunity, More: A Callfor Legislative Action, 63 MicH.
B.J. 126, 128 (1984) (quoting the findings of the California Law Revision Commission Study of
governmental immunity, "[g]overnment cannot merely be made liable as private persons are for
public entities are fundamentally different from private persons").
13. See Spence, supra note 11, at 657.
14. FLA. CONsrT. art. I, § 21.
15. See Note, supra note 10, at 540-47 (classification of the 50 states by the degree of sovereign
immunity retained).
16. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957) ("[T]he
time has arrived to declare this doctrine anachoristic [sic] not only to our system of justice but to
our traditional concepts of democratic government.").
17. See, e.g., Wallace v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 376 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1979) ("[T]he possible permutations resulting in the Government bearing the financial responsibility
for the misdeeds of the private sector, simply because it is trying to safeguard the general public
by regulatory action, is staggering.").
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public duty doctrine, and discretionary-operational dichotomy.' 8 Historically,
Florida courts utilized the proprietary-governmental distinction and the public
duty doctrine. The operational-discretionary distinction is the standard currently
applied in Florida, the federal courts 19 and numerous other jurisdictions. 2°
A.

The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction

While the State of Florida and its counties once enjoyed absolute immunity
21
for tortious actions, Florida municipalities have never enjoyed a similar status.
22
In City of Tallahassee v. Fortune, the Florida Supreme Court held a municipal
corporation may sue and be sued like any other corporation.2 3 Municipal liability
was subsequently limited by the introduction of the distinction between governmental and proprietary activities. 24 In Keggin v. Hillsborough County, 25 the court
declared that a municipality enjoys the state's immunity only when it acts as
an arm of the state, and not when the municipality exercises its quasi-private
corporate functions. 26 This holding prompted the rule that municipalities may
27
be held liable for proprietary functions but not for governmental functions.
The rule was justified by the fact that citizens have a proprietary interest in
the municipality's property. 23 Thus, unless a municipality is acting as a governmental body, it should be subject to the same legal obligations as a private
corporation. 29 Generally, functions are proprietary if they are performed to obtain a special benefit for the citizens within the city's corporate limits. 30 A
governmental function stems from the state's sovereignty and is performed for
the benefit and welfare of the public at large.' These overlapping definitions
proved difficult for the courts to apply and consequently created much confusion

18.
19.
20.

See Note, Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspection, 23 Loy. L.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); seeinfra note 70.
See Note, supra note 10, at 543.

REV.

458, 460-78 (1977).

21.
Budetti & Knight, The Latest Event in the Confused History of Municipal Tort Liability, 6 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 927, 929 (1978). See generally Ostrow & Lowe, Sovereign Immunity, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1297 (1979) (presents an extensive history of sovereign immunity in Florida).
22. 3 Fla. 19 (1850).
23. Id. at 26. The city was held liable for the death of a horse which fell into a ditch in
the street.

24.

See

STAFF OF FLA. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS,

A REVIEW OF SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY 21 (Dec. 1982) (Senator Warren S. Henderson, Chairman) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REVIEW].
25. 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 372 (1916).
26. Id. at 362, 71 So. at 37"1.
27. See STAFF REVIEW, supra note 24, at 21.
28. Keggin, 71 Fla. at 361, 71 So. at 373.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., City of Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 130, 27 So. 2d 825 (1946) (the negligent
operation of a police car); Smoak v. City of Tampa, 123 Fla. 716, 167 So. 528 (1936) (the pickup and disposal of garbage is proprietary).
31.
City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 24, 10 So. 2d 721, 723-24 (1942). See also Ballard
v. City of Tampa, 124 Fla. 457, 168 So. 654 (1936) (narrowed governmental function to include
actions that were solely governmental).
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and uncertainty. Courts were forced to make decisions on a case-by-case basis
32
and the results were often harsh and inconsistent.
The first Florida decision involving municipal enforcement of a building
code occurred during the governmental-proprietary era. In Akin v. City of Miami,33
the city condemned plaintiff's building and refused to issue plaintiff a building
permit, thereby preventing the building's repair. The Florida Supreme Court
denied relief and held the granting or withholding of a building permit was a
purely governmental function for which the city could not be liable.3 4 In response
to the rising judicial criticism of the governmental-proprietary distinction, the
court claimed that the responsibility for altering the rule rested with the legislature.35
Four years later the court itself attempted to end the confusion and injustice
surrounding the governmental-proprietary distinction. In Hargrove v, Town of
Cocoa Beach,36 the court held a municipal corporation may be liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Discarding the governmental-proprietary distinction, the court determined that municipalities were liable for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee acting within the
scope of his employment.3 7 However, the court added one caveat to this general
rule. Municipalities could not be liable for negligent performance of legislative,
judicial, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial acts. 38 Since these exceptions are analogous to the current discretionary function exception, isolating these types of
39
municipal acts is a task Florida courts still wrestle with today.
B.

The Public Duty Doctrine

By limiting the applicability of sovereign immunity, Hargrove prompted a
change the judiciary had been demanding for years. However, ten years later,
Modlin v. City of Miami Beach4 erected a new barrier to shield municipalities
from liability. The Modlin court adopted the public duty doctrine, which provides
32. Compare Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922) (city liable for
the negligent operation of a fire truck) with Brownlee v. City of Orlando, 157 Fla. 524, 26 So.
2d 504 (1946) (city immune from liability when jailor assaulted prisoner).
33. 65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1953).
34. Id. at 55.
35. Id. at 56. The belief that change must come from the legislature stemmed from the fact
that Florida adopted the common law of England that was in force on July 4, 1776. However,
since the case credited with first adopting sovereign immunity, Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng.
Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788), was not decided until 1788, sovereign immunity could not have been adopted
by Florida when the common law was adopted as of July 4, 1776. City of Miami v. Bethel, 65
So. 2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1953) (Hobson, J., concurring specially in judgment of reversal).
36. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
37. Id. at 133. Mrs. Hargrove brought suit against the city alleging that the negligence of
the town jailer had caused her husband's death. Mr. Hargrove, jailed for drunkenness, had died
in a fire when he was left unattended in the jail with all of the doors locked. Id. at 131.
38. Id. at 133.
39. The discretionary exception became the law in 1979. See infta notes 70-78 and accompanying text. It has been described as judicial, legislative, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. Department of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071, 1079-80 (Fla. 1982) (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
40. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
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that where a duty is owed to the public, no duty arises to an individual absent
41
a showing of a special relationship.
In Modlin, the City of Miami Beach approved building plans for the construction of an overhead storage mezzanine. Additionally, the city inspected the
construction during the progress of the work. Five years later Mrs. Modlin was
crushed to death when the mezzanine collapsed on her while she was shopping.
Applying Hargrove, the Third District Court of Appeal held the city could not
be liable because the enforcement of building regulations was an exercise of a
42
legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial function.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court found the Third District had interpreted Hargrove too broadly. The court maintained that issuing building permits and inspecting construction sites were executive functions which did not
fall within the Hargrove exception. 43 The court reasoned that since the city was
vicariously liable for the building inspector's negligence, the city was entitled
to use whatever defenses were available to the inspector.4 4 Applying the public
duty doctrine, the court held that a public official cannot be liable for negligence
unless the plaintiff shows the official owed the plaintiff a greater duty than that
owed the general public. 45 Because the building inspector owed no special duty
46
to Mrs. Modlin, the city was not liable.
The district courts interpreted Modlin as a partial resurrection of the governmental-proprietary distinction. 47 After Modlin municipalities continued to be
subject to the same tort liability as private corporations for proprietary activities.
However, the public duty doctrine imposed tort liability on municipalities for
governmental functions only in limited situations. Municipalities could only be
liable if the tort was committed against one in privity with the city or against
one who directly transacted with the city 48
Following the legislative waiver of sovereign immunity in Florida the public
duty doctrine was abolished.4 9 A majority of jurisdictions still rely on the public
41. Id. at 76.
42. Modlin v. Washington Ave. Food Center, 178 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965).
43. Modlin, 201 So. 2d at 73-74. The court further refined the Hargrove exception by explaining
the meanings of legislative and judicial acts. The court held that legislative actions prescribe a
general rule for future operation. Judicial actions were described as the application of general rules
to specific situations accompanied by the judicial procedures of notice and hearing. Executive
functions, which were not covered by the Hargrove exception, were described as the application of
general rules to specific situations without utilizing judicial procedures. Id.
44. Id. at 75.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 76.
47. City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450, 452-53 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969) (the Modlin
requirement of special duty was applicable only to governmental functions, not proprietary functions).
48. Gordon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (liability of
the city for negligence in the design, construction, and maintenance of the streets is unaffected by
the Modlin requirement of a special duty since it involves a proprietary function).
49. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979).
The court stated,
we believe it to be circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of action exists for a
negligent act or omission by an agent of the state or its poiltical subdivisions where the
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duty doctrine, even after the waiver of sovereign immunity.50 Recovery for
negligent building inspection is generally denied in these jurisdictions on the
ground that building codes do not create a duty to an individual. 5' Rather,
building codes are designed to protect the community as a whole. Thus, a city's
failure to properly enforce the code is not negligence per se.52 The public duty
doctrine recognizes a duty to an individual only if the statute indicates a clear
intent to benefit a particular class of individuals53 or the plaintiff establishes a
54
special relationship with the municipality.
The Florida Supreme Court has held the public duty doctrine is merely a
vestige of sovereign immunity. 55 However, other jurisdictions insist the public
duty doctrine is based on traditional tort principles which are independent of
sovereign immunity.56 These jurisdictions maintain that imposing a duty of care
on municipalities merely because an inspection is undertaken would create a

duty breached is said to be owed to the public at large but not to any particular person.
This is the "general duty-special duty" dichotomy emanating from Modlin. By less kind
commentators, the theory has been characterized as one which results in a duty to none
where there is a duty to all.
Id.
50. See Note, supra note 18, at 467.
51. See, e.g., Dufrene v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097 (Ct. App.) (government not liable for
damages incurred in fire, even where a prior inspection of the premises had been negligently made),
cert. denied, 343 So. 2d 446 (La. 1977); Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d
1059 (1973) (inspections mandated by the fire code are a duty owed to the general public and not
to the owner or occupier of the premises); Georges v. Tudor, 16 Wash. App. 407, 556 P.2d 564
(1976) (building owner had no cause of action against city for negligently issuing building permit
and negligent inspection since building inspection is conducted for the benefit of the public).
52. Generally the negligence per se standard is not imposed on private individuals for failing
to comply with building codes. See, e.g., Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Modular Age, Inc., 363 So. 2d
1152 (1st D.C.A. 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1979). Cf. Brown v. South Broward
Hosp. Dist., 402 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (violation of building code constitutes negligence
per se).
53. See Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1978) (city was
liable for the death of a man in a fire caused by the city's failure to enforce a housing code based
on the court's finding of a clear intent in the statute to protect the welfare of the occupants). Cf.
Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Iowa 1979) ("A general statutory duty is ordinarily
for the benefit of all persons who are likely to be exposed to injury from its nonobservance.")
(quoting Hansen v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 1012, 208 N.W. 277, 277 (1926)).
54. A special relationship was established in Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1,
530 P.2d 234 (1975). In Campbell, the city's electrical inspector discovered a dangerous electrical
current in a neighborhood stream after the plaintiff requested that the city come out and make
an inspection. The inspector failed to take corrective action and the plaintiff's wife was electrocuted
while attempting to save her son who had fallen into the stream. Id. at 235-36. See also Cracraft
v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806-07 (Minn. 1979) (four factors which should be
considered in finding a special relationship are: (1) actual knowledge of the dangerous condition;
(2) reasonable reliance by persons on the municipality's representations and conduct; (3) an ordinance or statute that sets forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of
persons rather than the public as a whole; and (4) the municipality must use due care to avoid
increasing the risk of harm).
55. See supra note 49.
56. See, e.g., Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn. 1979); J. &
B. Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 303, 669 P.2d 468, 471-72 (1983).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVII

new tort.-" Since the waiver of sovereign immunity does not create new causes
of action,5" defenders of the public duty doctrine find this liability unsupportable.5 9
Although not yet a majority position, the trend is to abolish the public duty
doctrine. 60 Rejecting the notion that a duty to all is a duty to none, 6' a number
of courts have found that a municipality must be held to have foreseen that
a negligent inspection might result in harm to an individual. 6 Thus, once an
inspection is undertaken a duty to exercise reasonable care arises. 63 These courts
have held governmental agencies liable for negligent building inspections; how64
ever, courts have been reluctant to impose liability for a failure to inspect.
III.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER THE OPERATIONAL-DISCRETIONARY
DICHOTOMY

In 1973 the Florida Legislature waived sovereign immunity by enacting
Florida Statutes section 768.28 which provides that the state, its agencies and
subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims to the same extent as private individuals. 6 1 Section 768.28 prohibits punitive damages and interest for the period
before judgment. 66 Additionally, the statute limits liability to $100,000 for a
67
claim by one person and to the aggregate sum of $200,000 per incident. If
a judgment in excess of the statutory limit is rendered, the excess may be

57.

J. & B. Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 303, 669 P.2d 468, 471-72 (1983).

58. See, e.g., Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, 293 Minn. 220, 223, 199 N.W.2d 158,
159-60 (1972) (statutory waiver of sovereign immunity did not create new liability for municipalities).
Cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950) (the Federal Tort Claims Act does not create
new causes of action).
59. See Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806.
60. H. MILLER, TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT CODE INSPECTION
4 (Draft prepared for the Fed. Emergency Management Agency, 1982). See, e.g., Wilson v. Nepstad,
282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Brennen v. City of
Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247
N.W.2d 132 (1976).
61. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976).
62. Id.
63. Private inspectors have been held to owe a duty to those injured as a result of a negligent
inspection. See Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112- (5th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff
injured in a hotel fire had a cause of action against hotel's insurer who had allegedly negligently
inspected the hotel), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971).
64. See H. MILLER, supra note 60, at 6.
65. FLA. STAT. S 768.28(5) (1985) ("The State and its agencies and subdivisions shall be
liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the period before
judgment."). See also FLA. CONST. art. X, 5 13 ("Provision may be made by general law for
bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating."). The
Florida Statutes specifically include municipalities in the definition of state agencies or subdivisions.
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (1985). Thus, the statute breaks with history and makes the liability of
municipalities co-equal with the liability of other subdivisions of the state. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
66. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1985).
67. Id.
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reported to the legislature.6s The legislature may pay the excess or any part of
69
it at its* discretion.
The Federal Tort Claims Act 70 and many state statutes which waive sovereign immunity expressly provide that the government shall not be liable for
discretionary activities. 7' The Florida statute, however, contains no such exception. The Florida Supreme Court added this exception in Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County. 72 Here, the supreme court stated that the separation
of powers concept, rather than sovereign immunity, made the exception necessary. To prevent judicial intrusion into the executive branch, the court held
that the wisdom of governmental discretionary activities cannot be reviewed by
judge or jury.73 Thus, the court concluded that certain policy-making, planning
or judgmental government functions cannot be the subject of traditional tort

liability.7"
In an effort to avoid the type of semantic labels which had confused courts
in the past, the supreme court rejected a definitional approach to establish what
activities are discretionary.7 Instead, the court suggested that the four-prong
test devised by the Washington Supreme Court in Evangelical United Brethren
Church v. State76 be used on a case-by-case basis to aid courts in determining
what governmental activities are to be immune from liability. The test consists
of the following questions:

68. Id.
69. Id. The legislature may authorize payments through claims legislation. Claims bills are
designed to insure that injured parties are fully compensated. Between 1978 and 1982 a total of
$1,639,270.26 in unsatisfied judgments was reported to the legislature. The legislature satisfied the
total amount and added $30,000 to the amount of the awarded judgment in one case. STAFF
REVIEW, supra note 24, at 49.
70. 28 U.S.C. 95 2671-2680 (1976). The discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims act bars:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
71.
MINN.

See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. 5 09.50.250(l) (1983); IOWA CODE ANN. 9 25A.14(I) (West 1967);
5 466.03(6) (West 1980); Op. REV. STAT. S 30.265(3)(c) (1980); UTAH CODE

STAT. ANN.

5 63.30.10(1)(a) (1983). The predecessor to Florida's current waiver of sovereign immunity
contained an exception for discretionary functions. FLA. STAT. § 768.15 (1969) (repealed 1970).
72. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
73. Id. at 1017-20.
To accept a jury's verdict as to the reasonableness and safety of a plan of governmental
body which originally considered and passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal
governmental operations and to place in inexpert hands what the Legislature has seen fit
to entrust to expertsId. at 1018 (quoting Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 167 N.E.2d 63, 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409,
413 (1960) (Fuld, J.)).
74. rd. at 1019.
75. Id. at'1020-21.
76. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965) (implied a discretionary function exception into
Washington's legislative waiver of sovereign immunity).
ANN.
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1. Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve
a basic governmental policy program or objective?

2. Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course of the policy, program,
or objective?

3. Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved?

4. Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority
and duty to do or make the
7
challenged act, omission, or decision? 1
If the questions can all be answered affirmatively, then the act is to be considered discretionary. If one or more of the questions is answered negatively,
78
further inquiry is required.
Following Commercial Carrier, municipalities have been held liable for a myriad
of activities. 79 Although courts have applied the four-prong test adopted by
Commercial Carrier, several courts have concluded the test is of little aid in determining the governmental activities which should remain immune from tort
liability. 80 The decision has essentially been reduced to whether a municipal
activity is labeled "operational" or "discretionary." 8 1 Applying these labels has
also proven burdensome. The question of which governmental activities are
"planning level" and which are "operational level" has produced a rash of
cases certified to the Florida Supreme Court.8 2 As the law in this area becomes

77. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1019 (quoting Evangelical United Brethren Church, 67 Wash.
2d at 255, 407 P.2d at 445).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982) (design of city's
water drainage system); Shite v. Palm Beach County, 404 So. 2d 123 (Fla 4th D.C.A. 1981)
(operation of jail); Mathews v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 So. 2d 841 (2d D.C.A. 1981) (alteration
of natural state of creek), aff'd, 419 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982).
80. See Bryan v. State, Dep't of Bus. Reg., 438 So. 2d 415, 420 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983)
(the application of the four-prong test involves the application of the proverbial square peg to the
round hole); Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste, Inc., 433 So. 2d 559, 562 (2d D.C.A.) (the
four-prong test was found to be uninstructive), pet. for rev. denied, 441 So. 2d 632 (Fla 1983).
81.
Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste, Inc., 433 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983)
("We were handed a new set of labels to apply to governmental activity discretionary and
nondiscretionary, or operational and planning level.").
82. See City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982); Ingham v. State,
Dep't of Transp., 419 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1982); Department of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d
1071 (Fla. 1982); Carter v. City of Stuart, 433 So. 2d 699 (4th D.C.A. 1983), aff'd, 468 So. 2d
955 (Fla. 1985). Faced with the issue of whether a municipality can be liable for failing to enforce
a dogcatcher ordinance, the Carter court stated:
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more confusing and uncertain, courts are questioning the broad waiver of sovereign immunity effected by Florida Statutes section 768.28.83
A.

Application to Municipal Building Inspection

Despite the confusion created by the operational level/planning level dichotomy, two Florida district courts have concluded that governmental inspections are an operational level activity. 84 In Trianon Park Condominium Association,

Inc. v. City of Hialeah,5 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal stated that
the initial decision to inspect and certify construction is a planning level decision.
However, the court held the actual inspection, plan review and certification are
operational level activities for which a municipality may be subject to tort
86
liability.
In Trianon, the roof of a sixty-five unit condominium collapsed three years
after the City of Hialeah issued a certificate of occupancy. Filing a class action
suit, the condominium association claimed the developer was liable for breach
of warranty, negligence and strict liability. Additionally, the association alleged
the City of Hialeah was negligent in approving the building plans, inspecting
the construction and issuing the certificate of occupancy. At trial, the condominium association presented evidence which established the defects which caused
the roof to collapse were in violation of the applicable building code. The court
found the city had breached its duty to the association by failing to properly
enforce the code requirements. The damages totaled $290,938.84. The developer
settled with the association prior to trial for $153,000. The court entered judgment against the city for $50,000.7

On appeal, the city argued that its actions were immunized by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. 8 This argument failed and the court increased the judgment against the city from $50,000 to $100,000.9 In concluding that building
As to the overall question of what constitutes "planning" and what is "operational," it
is our view that the Florida case law is in disarray. Indeed, the only way out of the
impasse at the District Court level is to certify each and every case to the Supreme Court,
on its particular facts, and let our superiors show us the way until the law is clarified or
Commercial Carrier is receded from.
433 So. 2d at 670.
83. See Bryan v. State, Dep't of Bus. Reg., 438 So. 2d 415, 421 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983);
Wallace v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 376 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979).
84. See Manors of Inverrary XII Condominium Ass'n v. Atreco-Florida, Inc., 438 So. 2d
490 (4th D.C.A. 1983), pet. for rev. dismissed sub noma., Lauderhill v. Manors of Inverrary XII
Condominium Ass'n, 450 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1984); Byran v. State, Dep't of Bus. Reg., 438 So.
2d 415 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983); Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 423 So.
2d 911 (3d D.C.A. 1982), quashed, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985); Jones v. City of Longwood, 404
So. 2d 1083 (5th D.C.A. 1981), pet. for rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1982).
85. 423 So. 2d 911 (3d D.C.A. 1982), quashed, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
86. 423 So. 2d at 913.
87. Id. at 912.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 914. The judgment was increased according to statute. The relevant Florida statute
provided that a state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable to pay a claim or judgment
by any one person for up to $50,000 and may be liable up to $100,000 per incident. FLA. STAT.
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inspection was an operational activity, the appellate court relied on the fourprong test adopted by Commercial Carrier.90 The court determined that questions
(1) and (4) could be answered affirmatively. Municipal inspection and certification of buildings involved a basic governmental policy, and the city possessed
the requisite authority to undertake those actions. The court found that questions
(2) and (3) required a negative response. City inspections, plan reviews and
certification for a particular condominium did not change the overall direction
of a government policy. Moreover, enforcement of the building code standards
did not involve basic policy evaluations but rather involved purely ministerial
acts. 9 '
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal followed the Trianon decision in
Manors of Inverrary XII Condominium Association, Inc. v. Atreco-Florida, Inc.9 2 Manors
involved an action similar to that in Trianon; however, the damages in Manors
consisted solely of the cost of repairing the defects. 93 Here, the district court
held the examination of plans and specifications for the issuance of a building
permit and on-site inspections to determine building code compliance were operational activities. 94 Thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not shield
a municipality from liability for the negligence of its building inspector in approving plans, specifications and construction which violated the South Florida
95
Building Code.
In dissent, Chief Judge Anstead argued that the municipality owed no duty
to the condominium owners and that a finding of municipal liability made the
government insurers of the quality of private developments.9 6 The dissent urged
that the responsibility of building in compliance with building codes should rest
solely on the developer and his agents. 97 Judge Anstead noted that allowing the
condominium association to recover from the municipality will lead to a situation
in which the developer may also be able to recover from the municipality.
§ 768.28(5) (1975). The court determined that the 65 unit owners were entitled to the per incident
level of recovery rather than the per person level. 423 So. 2d at 914. The legislature subsequently
increased the amount recoverable against the state, a county, or a municipality to $100,000 per
person and $200,000 per incident. FLA. STAT. 5 768.28(5) (1985).
90. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
91. Trianon, 423 So. 2d at 913.
92. 438 So. 2d 490 (4th D.C.A. 1983), pet. for rev. dismissed, 450 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1984).
93. 438 So. 2d at 495-96.
94. Id. at 492.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 495. Several federal courts have found this argument compelling in federal regulatory
inspection situations. See, e.g., Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1151 (1st Cir. 1977)
("We do not believe that the expanded role of the federal government in the safety area through
such legislation as OSHA indicates an intent of Congress to make the United States a joint insurer
of all activity subject to inspection under that statute or others. Nor do we believe that there is
any sound policy basis for requiring that government attempts to protect the public must be
accompanied by per se tort liability if they are unsuccessfully carried out."), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1006 (1978). See generally Dombroff, Certification and Inspection: An Overview of Governmsent Liability, 47

J. Am L.
liable for
97.
98.

& CoM. 229 (1982) (government inspections are so pervasive that to hold the government
negligence would make the government a party defendant in virtually every suit).
Manors, 438 So. 2d at 498.
See infra notes 144-61 and accompanying text.
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Judge Anstead concluded that to allow such municipal liability will allow the
construction industry to rely on the government to guarantee building code
compliance. 99 Alternatively, Judge Anstead contended that if municipalities are
to be held liable, the type of damages recoverable should be limited. While
public safety may justify damages for injuries, Judge Anstead found no justification for requiring the municipality to pay for repairs or improvements needed
to bring a building up to code standards.100
B.

The Reversal of Trianon

In a split decision the Florida Supreme Court reversed the Third District
Court of Appeal's decision in Trianon'0' and held that the city was immune
from liability for its police functions, including negligent building inspection.
The court found that city building inspectors owed no duty to individual citizens
and that the state did not intend to waive its immunity for activities such as
building inspections.1 02 Both of these justifications for municipal immunity have
02
been previously asserted and rejected.'
Despite condemning the public duty doctrine in Commercial Carrier, the siipreme court embraced this doctrine in Trianon.' ° The court maintained, however, that the Commercial Carrier opinion was not being receded from. 10 5 Relying
on basic negligence principles, the court reasoned that government liability cannot exist without either a common law or statutory duty. The court found that
the waiver of sovereign immunity established no new duty of care for government entities. Since no duty existed at common law to prevent the misconduct
of third persons, the court held no common law duty existed for a government
entity to enforce the law. Additionally, the court found that the adoption of a
0 6
building code created no statutory duty for the benefit of individual citizens.
Attempting to distinguish Commercial Carrier's rejection of the public duty
doctrine, the Trianon court found that Commercial Carrier dealt with a narrow
factual situation in which a dear common law duty existed absent sovereign
immunity.'0 7 Commercial Carrierinvolved the maintenance of existing traffic lights.
As Justice Ehrlich pointed out in his dissent in Trianon, however, no common
law duty existed to maintain traffic control devices. The government performed

99. Manors, 438 So. 2d at 498.
100. Id.
101. 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
102. See id. at 915, 921.
103. See supra notes 24-32 & 49 and accompanying text.
104. Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 918.
105. Id. at 923.
106. Id. at 917-18, 921-23. However, in dissent Justice Ehrlich explained: "It is well settled
at common law that a statute creates a duty running from one whose behavior is the subject of
the statute to an individual if that individual is in the class designed to be protected by the statute
and the injury suffered is the harm the statute is intended to prevent." The Justice further explained
that the building code statute clearly mandated no building permit or certificate of occupancy be
issued unless the building code was complied with. Justice Ehrlich found that a statutory duty was
created thereby. Id. at 925.
107. Id. at 918.
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this service and, prior to Commercial Carrier, the government was immune from
suit. Thus, this specific common law duty could never have developed prior
to Commercial Carrier.'°8
The Trianon court's attempt to distinguish Commercial Carrier also fails considering the facts of Modlin. Mlodlin was the first Florida decision to recognize
the public duty doctrine 19 and was expressly overruled in Commercial Carrier."'
The Modlin court held that city building inspectors owed no duty to individuals
injured by their negilgence but owed a duty only to the general public."'
Although Modlin had been expressly overruled, the Trianon court, in a building
inspection case similar to Modlin, attempted to distinguish that rejection.
The Trianon court's second basis for finding that the city was immune from
2
liability was also specifically rejected in Commercial Carrier." The argument that
exclusively government activities are immune from suit because they are not
the type of activities engaged in by private individuals has also been rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in construing the Federal Tort Claims
Act." 3 Like the Federal Tort Claims Act, Florida's statute waiving sovereign
immunity provides for government liability "in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.'' 4 The court in
Commercial Carrier agreed with the United States Supreme Court that this language was not intended to revive the government-proprietary distinction that
5
had led to such confusion in the past."
While private persons may not have been liable for specific government
activities, private individuals have been held liable under the "Good Samaritan"
doctrine."16 An individual, like the government, may be liable for the failure
to use reasonable care if the individual undertakes to warn the public of a
danger and thereby induces reliance." 7 The broad scope of the Good Samaritan
doctrine demonstrates that an action for negligence does not depend on the
specific task undertaken or whether a previous defendant has negligently performed the precise task in question. However, the court in Trianon disregarded
its previous analysis and held that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not
intended to create causes of action for activities that are inherently governmental
in nature.""
The Trianon court also relied on the operational-discretionary distinction
established in Commercial Carrier. In an attempt to clarify the law, the court
divided government functions into four categories: (1) legislative, permitting,
licensing, and executive officer functions; (2) enforcement of laws and the pro-

108. Id. at 924.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1016-17.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1950).
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1950).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 323 (1965).
See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 921.
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tection of the public safety; (3) capital improvements and property control operations; and (4) providing professional, educational, and general services for
the health and welfare of the citizens. 119 The court found there could be no
tort liability for government activities which fell in categories 1 and 2 due to
the separation of powers doctrine; moreover, a common law duty of care has
never existed with regard to these types of government activities. Building inspection, along with other regulatory functions, was found to fall within category
2 and thus was labeled a discretionary function which is immune from tort
liability. Government functions which fall within categories 3 and 4 may give
rise to government liability. The court found that these two categories should
utilize the four-prong test adopted by Commercial Carrier.20 By dividing government functions into these categories, the court essentially separated activities
that only the government performs from activities that both the government
and private citizens perform. The court then proceeded to enlarge the discretionary function exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity to include all
government activities that only the government performs.
C.

Building Inspection -

Operational or Discretionary?

In an effort to avoid substandard housing, local governments have been
enforcing minimum building standards since colonial times. 21 Building codes
became increasingly popular during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as local governments attempted to deal with the problems of fire and
disease in crowded cities.122 The purpose of the frequently used modern building
codes is to provide minimum requirements to safeguard life, health and public
1 23
welfare and to protect property.
The Florida Building Codes Act 24 requires local governments and state agencies with building construction responsibilities to adopt a building code.' 25 Local
governments may choose from a list of nationally recognized model codes. Although the Trianon court determined that building inspectors have discretionary
power to enforce compliance, local governments are obligated by statute to
enforce the code adopted. 26 Florida's building code enforcement system as outlined in the Florida Building Codes Act is typical of the system in most jurisdictions. Under this system, the builder must first apply for a building permit

119.

Id. at 919.

120. Id. at 919-21.
121. Note, The Home Buyers' Protection Act: An Alternative to Building Codes for Single Family Homes,
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 529 (1981). Structural defects were dealt with severely by Babylonian
law. The Code of Hammurabi provides: "If a builder builds a house for man and does not make
its construction firm, and the house which he has built collapses and causes the death of the owner
of the house, the builder shall be put to death." Blawie, Legal Liability of Building Officials for
Structural Failures, 57 CONN. B.J. 211, 211 (1983).
122. See Note, supra note 121, at 530.
123. STANDARD BUILDINO CODE, preface (SBCC 1979).
124. FLA. STAT.§§ 553.70-.895 (1983).

125.

Id. § 553.73(1)(a).

126.

Id. § 553.73(2)-(5).
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by paying a fee and submitting the building plans.127 The building official
examines the plans for compliance with the building code. If the plans comply,
a building permit is issued and construction may begin.' 28 After completion of
specified phases of construction an inspector is sent to the site to ensure that
the construction conforms to the plans and meets reasonable standards of workmanship.' 29 The building inspector has the power to issue stop work orders3 °
and to revoke building permits in the enforcement process.' 3' Upon completion
of construction, a final inspection is required and a certificate of occupancy is
132
issued if code requirements have been met.
The Third District Court of Appeal in Trianon concluded that the majority
of an inspector's work involved making simple measurements and merely enforcing the building code as written. 133 Many commentators agree that little
discretion is exercised in enforcing most inspection statutes.' 34 However, others
claim the complexity of building codes leaves much discretion to the building
official.' 35 Building officials determine the meaning of building code provisions
when applied to a particular set of plans. 36 Additionally, to prevent the stifling
of innovative construction, the model codes all provide that the building official
shall determine whether proposed alternative methods are at least equivalent to
the methods prescribed by the code.' 37 This decisionmaking mandates expertise
and judgment calls. 3 '
Professional judgment and expertise, however, do not elevate a decision to
a discretionary level. Federal courts applying the operational/discretionary dichotomy have held that, although regulatory inspections often call for judgmental
127. STANDARD BUILDING CODE 105.1-.4 (SBCC 1979).
128. Id. 106.3.
129. The Standard Building Code requires at least three inspections: (1) Foundation Inspection
- made after trenches are excavated and forms erected; (2) Frame Inspection - to be made after
the roof, all framing, fire-blocking and bracing is in place and all pipes, chimneys, and vents are
complete; (3) Final Inspection to be made after the building is completed and ready for occupancy. The inspector may make other inspections deemed necessary. Id. 108.1-.2.
130. Id. 103.2.
131.
Id. 103.3.
132. Three inspections by the city are not the equivalent of supervision. See Blawie, supra note
121, at 221.
It is absurd to think that an occasional visit of short duration by a building official can
given anything but a superficial knowledge of the manner in which a large job is being
performed. The larger the city, and the more building sites or buildings there are to
examine, the more cursory will be the municipal building official's inspection.
Id.
133.
Trianon, 423 So. 2d at 913.
134. See Stone & Rinker, Governmental Liabiliy for Negligent Inspections, 57 TUL. L. REv. 328,
346 (1978) (duties of governmental inspector ministerial); Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire
Inspection, 13 COL. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 343 (1977) (fire inspection a purely ministerial act).
135. See Blawie, supra note 11, at 215-18; Note, supra note 121, at 535. Cf. Fiduccia v. Summit
Hill Constr. Co., 109 N.J. Super. 249, 255, 262 A.2d 920, 923 (1970) (issuance of a certificate
of occupancy does not involve planning or policy functions; however, it does involve the exercise
of discretion).
136. See Note, supra note 121, at 535.
137. See, e.g., STANDARD BUILDING CODE 103.6 (SBCC 1979).
138.

See Note, supra note 121, at 535.
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determinations, the type of judgment involved is generally of an expert or
scientific nature.1 39 The discretionary exception is designed to immunize public
policy decisions, not merely professional decisions. 14° Thus, while building inspection involves the exercise of discretion, it does not involve policy level
decisions which, if subject to judicial review, would raise the issue of separation
of powers.' 4 ' Almost all governmental functions involve the exercise of some
discretion. 142 Reading the discretionary exception as broadly as the Florida Supreme Court did in Trianon immunizes the majority of governmental activities,
making governmental immunity the rule rather than the exception. 43
IV.

THE POSSIBLE PERMUTATIONS OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

The reversal of Trianon stemmed the tide of municipal liability. Trianon and
Manors both involved the duty municipalities owe to the purchasers of new
homes. The Mdnors dissent suggested that the next step in municipal liability
would be to extend the municipality's duty to the developer.'" The Manors
dissent questioned the extent to which a developer or other party could shift
the loss from construction defects onto the municipality were municipalities held
liable for negligent building inspection. The fear that developers would attempt
139. See Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1983) (federal mine inspections
not within discretionary function exception); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1184
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (exercise of professional discretion in conducting OSHA inspection not within
discretionary function). But cf. United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viaco Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984). The Varig Court reversed two Ninth Circuit decisions
which held that inspections by the Federal Aviation Administration did not fall within the discretionary function exception. The Court found that there was no evidence that the specific airplanes
invovled were actually inspected. Accordingly, the Court interpreted the claim against the FAA to
allege negligence in implementing a spot-checking program not negligence in conducting an actual
inspection. Id. at 2757-58. However, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit were based on negligence
in carrying out an inspection. Neither decision mentioned the possibility that the two planes involved
were not actually inspected. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v.
United States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982); United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d
188 (1979), following remand, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982).
140. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974) (the critical inquiry is not
merely whether judgment was exercised, but also whether the judgment called for policy considerations). The leading case on the federal discretionary function exception is Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite, the United States Supreme Court held that cabinet level
decisions on the control of manufacturing, handling and shipping of fertilizer were discretionary
functions. The government was thus immunized from liability stemming from an explosion of
fertilizer which killed 560 and injured thousands. Id. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (operation of a lighthouse not within discretionary
function exception).
141. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
142. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 788, 447 P.2d 352, 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (1968)
("It would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did
not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving
of a nail.") (quoting Ham v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468
(1920)).
143. Department of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071, 1079 (Fla. 1982) ("[A] finding of
immunity is the exception rather than the rule.") (Sunberg, J., dissenting).
144. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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to recover from municipalities for negligent inspection may have influenced the
supreme court's decision in Trianon. Were municipalities not protected by sovereign immunity, developers could attempt to recover from municipalities on
three bases: direct actions, indemnification and contribution.
A.

Direct Actions -

Would the Municipality Owe a Duty to the Developer?

Florida courts have not addressed the issue of whether municipalities owe
a duty to the developer to use reasonable care in making building inspections.
Florida courts have held, however, that the owner of property being developed
has a nondelegable duty to see that the home constructed is reasonably free
from dangerous latent defects. 45' Additionally, building codes commonly provide
that compliance with the code is the responsibility of the owner., 46 These guidelines suggest the developer would not be able to hold the municipality liable
for damages caused by noncompliance with the building code, even if municipalities were not protected by sovereign immunity.
Cases from other jurisdictions, however, suggest that if an owner-developer
relies on a municipal inspection, the owner-developer may be entitled to recover
from the city. 14 7 In J. & B. Development Co. v. King County,'4 a builder who
began construction relying on a negligently issued building permit was awarded
economic damages. The builder had already begun construction when the city
discovered that the development did not comply with the zoning setback requirements. 49 The Washington Supreme Court held that because the county
issues building permits, inspects for compliance and is aware that permit holders
50
The
rely on the permits, the county has a duty to exercise reasonable care.'
court recognized that the builder had the same opportunity to detect the error
as the county and held that the builder's damages may be reduced under the
rules of comparative negligence.' 5 '
In Garrett v. Holiday Inn, Inc.,' 5 a town negligently approved changes in the
building plans of a motel which were in conflict with fire safety laws. The New
York Court of Appeals held the town had violated a duty it owed to the motel
owners but that the town owed no duty to the motel visitors who were injured
in the fire. Applying the public duty doctrine, the court found the town had

also

145.

Green Springs, Inc. v. Calvera, 239 So. 2d 264, 265 (Fla. 1970).

146.

See Brown v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 402 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981); see

FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE

S 15.25 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ. 1982).

147. But seeJohnson v. Salem Title Co., 246 Or. 409, 412, 425 P.2d 519, 521 (1967) (architect
cannot escape liability for failing to comply with building code due to reliance on the city building
inspector).
148. 100 Wash. 2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983).
149. Id. at 302, 669 P.2d at 470-71.
150. Id. at 307, 669 P.2d at 473. Relying on the public duty doctrine, the court held that
permit and inspection requirements do not create a duty of care owing to the public generally.
However, the court found that a special duty is owed to builders who rely on the accuracy of

permits. The court rejected the lower court's abandonment of the public duty doctrine but affirmed
the lower court's conclusion. Cf. J. & B. Dev. Co. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 942, 631
P.2d 1002 (1981) (abolishing the public duty doctrine).
151. See.]. & B. Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 303 n.1, 669 P.2d at 474 n.1.
152. 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983).
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breached a special duty it owed to the motel owners by failing to require them
to comply with applicable fire and safety laws. 53 Based on the duty to the
motel owners, the court held the town prqportionately liable for the harm suf54
fered by the motel guests.'
Both the J. & B. Development Co. and Garrett decisions based the existence
of a duty on the reliance of the owner. 5 5 Neither case addressed whether the
owner was entitled to rely. Some federal cases involving regulatory inspection
suggest that a party in the position of an owner-developer is not entitled to
rely. In United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States, 56 plaintiff sued the Federal
Aviation Administration for negligently inspecting and certifying a commercial
aircraft. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the government does
not undertake a primary duty to provide services when it engages in regulatory
inspections.' 57 The court further found that government inspections do not relieve other actors of their primary duty to assure that the underlying activity
is accomplished within the minimum government standards.' 5 8 In Raymer v.
United States,'5 9 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that parties primarily
responsible for mine safety were precluded from relying on federal mine inspections as a matter of law.' 60 Under this line of reasoning, developers would
be precluded from instituting direct actions against municipalities for negligently
6
failing to detect code violations during routine building inspections.' '
B.

Shifting the Loss by Indirect Actions

The waiver of sovereign immunity effected by Florida Statutes section 768.68

153.

Id. at 257, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.

154. Id. at 263-64, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. Relying on the public duty
doctrine, the court held that the mere failure of the city to uncover fire and safety violations would

not constitute a sufficient basis for imposing liability on the city. The court found, however, that
the city owed a special duty to the motel owners if, as the complaint alleged, the city had known
that the dangerous violations existed but had gone ahead and certified the premises as safe. The
court held that the city could be liable to the owners for direct injuries and any economic damages
the owners may suffer as a result of judgments against them. Id. at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 722,
460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. See generally Note, Garret v. Holiday Inns, Inc.: Expanding the Right of

Apportionment and Municipal Tort Liability, 4 PACE L. REv. 673 (1984).
155. J. & B. Deo. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 306-07, 669 P.2d at 472. See also Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d
at 778, 147 N.E.2d at 274 (1983).
156. 614 F.2d 188, 193 (1979), following remand, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, United
States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
See supra note, 139.

157. 614 F.2d at 193 ("Although such functions are carried out pursuant to statute or to
regulations, they do not arise from a primary duty to provide the service in question.").
158. Id. See, e.g., Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (by
conducting OSHA inspections the government has not undertaken to perform any duties of the

employer).
159. 660 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1981).
160. Id. at 1143.
161. See also Runkel v. Homelsky, 145 N.Y.S.2d 729 (App. Div. 1955) (city was entided to
recover from owners since owner was primarily responsible for maintaining building in safe condition).
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has not been limited to direct tort actions. 62 Thus, rather than initiating a
direct action against the municipality, the developer could join the municipality
in a third-party action seeking either indemnification or contribution. Such thirdparty actions are common in construction litigation as defendants attempt to
shift their liability. 163
1.

Indemnification

The law of indemnity allows a defendant held liable in tort for damages to
shift his entire loss to another responsible party.' 64 The distinction between active
and passive negligence1 65 has been abolished in Florida and thus, indemnity no
longer involves a weighing of relative fault of the tortfeasors. 66 Accordingly,
liability may only be shifted if the party seeking indemnity is totally without
fault and has been legally compelled to pay due to constructive or derivative
liability. '67 The party seeking indemnification can only recover from the party
68
who caused the constructive liability to be imposed.'
While damages may be recoverable from a developer for negligent construction,169 if the developer engaged in no independent acts of negligence, the developer is only vicariously liable.' 70 Accordingly, a developer may be entitled
to seek indemnification from parties who were negligent and whose negligence
was imputed to the developer.17 ' Since no basis exists for imputing the negligence

162. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1022 ("Actions for contribution or indemnity grounded
on tortious conduct of the state or its agencies and subdivisions are no less tort claims for purposes
of section 768.28 than direct actions."). See also Village of El Portal v. City of Miami Shores, 362
So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1978) (term "person" in Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act includes
municipalities). Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (waiver of immunity
effected by Federal Tort Claims Act not limited to direct actions).
163. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
164. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 493 (Fla. 1979). See generally Wethcrington, Tort Indemnity in Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 383 (1980) (tortfeasor at fault denied
common law indemnity).
165. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d at 493. Active negligence is the negligent
creation of a dangerous condition. Passive negligence is the negligent failure to discover a dangerous
condition. Prior to the abolition of this distinction, a party who was passively negligent was entitled
to indemnification from the party who was actively negligent. Wetherington, supra note 164, at
293. Were the active-passive distinction still applicable in Florida, a city held liable for negligent
building inspection could recover its loss from the construction defendants who actually created the
defects.
166. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 493 (Fla. 1979).
167. Id.
168. Id. ("Indemnity can only be applied where the liability of the person seeking indemnity
is solely constructive or derivative and only against one who, because of his act, has caused such
contructive liability to be imposed."). See generally Chesrow, Howard & Howard, Fault and Equity.
Implied Indemnity After Houdaille, 34 U. MIAMi L. REV. 727 (1980) (implied indemnity severely
restricted by requiring indemnitee to be without fault).
169. See supra note 2.
170. Biscayne Roofing v. Palmetto Fairway Condominium Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1982) (owner-developer who engaged in no independent acts of negligence was only vicariously liable for defective roof).
171. Id. at 1110. The Restatement of Restitution provides: "A person who, without personal
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of a city building inspector to a developer,' 72 the developer would not be entitled
to indemnification from a municipality which had negligently inspected the construction. The developer hires a contractor, architect and engineer to comply
with construction standards; -thus, these are the parties the developer can look
to for damages paid if the building was not properly constructed. 7 3 Therefore,
the fear expressed by the Manors dissent, 74 that without sovereign immunity
the total liability for noncompliance with building codes would fall on the municipality, is unfounded.
2.

Contribution

Contribution allows multiple tortfeasors who are liable to the same plaintiff
for the same injury to equalize the burden between them by compelling each
other to pay a pro rata share of the judgment. 175 The Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act provides that the relative degrees of fault of the parties
is the basis for determining each party's pro rata share. 7 6 Although the statute
does not require joint action, courts have required some interrelation among
the acts to sustain an action for contribution. 77 In VTN Consolidated, Inc. v.
Coastal Engineering,'78 Florida's Second District Court of Appeal denied contribution to a surveyor whose negligent acts had combined with the negligence
of an engineering firm to cause a single injury. The surveyor had negligently
prepared topographic maps. Two years later the engineering firm had allegedly
negligently misused these maps. Although the plaintiff, a land developer, suffered a single injury, the court held the liability of the surveyor and the engineering firm did not arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions.
Additionally, the court held that the surveyor and the engineering firm did not
79
share a common burden and thus a claim for contribution was not stated.
fault, has become subject to tort liability for the unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another,
is entitled to indemnity from the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such
liability." RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION § 96 (1937).
172. The city building official is not an agent of the developers, nor does the building official
inspect on behalf of the developer. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
173. FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.25 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ.
1982). See Manors, 438 So. 2d at 498 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
174. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
175. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. 1975) (receding from principle of no
contribution in Florida); see generally Coffey, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Florida-Case Law
Survey and Analysis, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 971 (1981) (effect of release from liability on joint
tortfeasors who settle with plaintiffs under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act).
176. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (1985). The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful
death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been
recovered against all or any of them.
Id.
177.
178.
179.

See Coffey, supra note 175, at 975.
341 So. 2d 226 (2d D.C.A. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1977).
341 So. 2d at 229. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Sun Bank, 366 So. 2d 465 (3d D.C.A.)
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Distinguishing VTN, Florida's First District Court of Appeal, in Salley v. Charles
R. Perry Construction, Inc. , so held that an architect and contractor are engaged
in a common effort to design and construct a building. The court found that
the architect and contractor both owed duties to the owner simultaneously; thus,
the architect's cross-claim stated a claim for contribution against the contractor. 181

Applying these decisions to the negligent building inspection scenario, it
appears that, without sovereign immunity, a developer would be able to claim
contribution from the municipality if the developer were sued by the purchaser
of a new home. The municipality and developer are simultaneously involved
in a common enterprise to comply with building codes. Therefore, a municipality could be joined in an action originally brought against a developer and
be required to pay a portion of the damages. Such an action would require
the municipality to have negligently inspected the construction and the defects
to have resulted from noncompliance with the building code. While the municipality would only be required to pay its pro rata share, this liability would
shift some of the burden of code compliance off the construction industry.
C.

Policy Considerations

The prime impetus for the abrogation of sovereign immunity was the injustice of leaving an injured plaintiff without a remedy when the government
was the wrongdoer. 8 2 However, in the negligent building inspection context,
not only are alternative remedies available, but other policy goals are furthered
by encouraging homeowners to pursue these remedies." s3 Construction law in
(accounting firm failed to establish a contribution theory against bank when the bank's potential
liability arose from honoring embezzled funds and the firm's liability arose from its failure to
discover the loss), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1979).
180. 403 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).
181.
Id. at 557.
182. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957); Williams
v. City of Green Cove Springs, 65 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.
2d 34, 37 (Fla. 1953). See Note, supra note 134, at 349.
183. The availability of alternative remedies has often been considered a factor in determining
the extent of government immunity. In Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961), the court stated:
[Vjarious factors furnish a means of deciding whether the agency in a particular case
should have immunity, such as the importance to the public of the function involved, the
extent to which governmental liability might impair free exercise of the function, and the
availability to individuals affected of remedies other than tort suits [against government]
for damages.
Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (quoted with approval in Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1021 (1979), aff'd per curiam, 398 So. 2d 488
(Fla. 1981). See also Johnson v. Collier County, 468 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) (considering
that claims were being pursued against other parties against whom the plaintiff may have recourse
beside the county); Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste, Inc., 433 So. 2d 559, 563 (2d D.C.A.)
(taking notice of pending claims against private parties, the court considered that the plaintiff had
remedies available other than a claim against the government), pet. for rev. denied, 441 So. 2d 632
(Fla. 1983); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn. 1979) (court considered that there were other viable defendants besides the city).
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Florida has developed to take the burden of construction defects off the home
buyer and to place it on those who profit from the sale: the construction industry.

84

Prior to 1972 the general rule of caveat emptor applied in Florida. 8 5 New
homeowners had little chance of recovery for latent construction defects discovered after purchase of their new homes. The extension of an implied warranty of habitability to the sale of new homes in Gable v. Silver88 marked the
beginning of a new era in Florida construction litigation. 8 7 Following Gable,
traditional tort remedies were also expanded to offer further protection to the
buyers of new homes. 88 In addition to actions against the developer, homeowners can now bring direct actions against contractors and architects with
whom they never dealt. 8 9 Purchasers of new condominiums also enjoy a threeyear statutory warranty in Florida. 90 In addition to the variety of remedies
available to a disgruntled home buyer, the typical construction claim involves
a host of possible defendants.'
Imposing an implied and statutory warranty of liability on the developer
rightfully shifts the cost of defects away from the unwary buyer and onto the
developer. 92 The developer has the knowledge and opportunity to prevent defects and the ability to distribute the cost through the market. 1 9 Direct actions
for negligence against architects, contractors and other parties place liability on
those who are actually involved in the construciton.
The liability that has been imposed on the developer and its agents serves
to ensure that quality homes are built. Municipal building inspection provides
an additional check on the private construction industry by policing its compliance with minimum government standards. Since municipal building inspections do not reduce the developer's duty to meet these standards, 94 no
justification exists for shifting a portion of the financial liability onto the municipality. While holding the municipality partially responsible for defective con-

184. See Manne, Condominium Construction Litigation, 54 FLA. B.J. 762, 763 (1980).
185. Id.
186. 258 So. 2d 11, 18 (4th D.C.A.), aff'd, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972). See generally Comment,
Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Homes, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 626 (1971) (discussion of caveat
emptor in Florida and its gradual abandonment in other jurisdictions).
187. FLORIDA CONDOMINiUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.11 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ.
1982) (following Gable Florida courts applied products liability theories to defective construction
situations).
188. Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Concepts, 373 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979)
(absence of contractual privity does not affect a plaintiff's negligence claim).
189. FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.9 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ.
1982).
190. FLA. STAT. § 718.203 (1985) (three-year warranty of fitness and merchantability).
191. The principal participants in a construction project are the owner (generally the developer),
architect, general contractor and subcontractors. See FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION LrrzoATION 29-35 (Fla.
Bar Continuing Legal Educ. 1982).
192. 258 So. 2d at 18; see Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 658 (Fla. 1983).
193. See Note, supra note 121, at 551.
194. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
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struction would not negate the developer's responsibility, it would provide an
95
economic disincentive for developers to conduct their own inspections.'
In support of imposing liability on municipalities, some commentators argue
that the threat of tort liability will motivate municipalities to upgrade their
inspection programs.' 6 Yet many of the inefficiencies in current building inspection programs are directly related to understaffing caused by a lack of
funding.' 9 ' These problems would only be exacerbated by imposing tort liability
on the municipality. Rather than improving inspection programs, municipalities
may be forced to reduce the number of inspections they perform.'9 8 The likelihood of this result is evidenced by the recent trend to remove mandatory
inspection language from government inspection legislation. 99
Due to the extensive nature of government inspection activities, the risk of
excessive liability is cited as a reason to limit municipal liability.2 °° The trend
in million dollar verdicts has frightened city officials.20 ' Overly generous judgments against municipalities have been blamed on the mistaken belief of jurors
that when the government pays, no one loses.2 1 2 Many commentators dismiss
fears of crippling judgments as unsubstantiated and argue that the government's
03
ability to pay should have no bearing on judicial determinations of liability.
This argument is based on the mistaken belief that tort law is divorced from
policy considerations. Policy questions, however, are inherent in the establishment of a duty. 0 4 These commentators also claim that municipal liability will
be limited by traditional tort principles. 20 5 The plaintiff must still prove the
breach of a duty, causation and damages. However, while a city would only
have to pay damages for its negligence, the cost of defense and the diversion
20 6
of litigation would take their toll.
V.

LIMITS ON LIABILITY

Even states with comprehensive waivers of sovereign immunity have imposed

195.
196.

See Note, supra note 10, at 560.
See, e.g., Stone & Rinker, supra note 134, at 344; Note, supra note 134, at 350.

197. See H. MILLER, supra note 60, at 8.
198. See Note, Municipal Liability for Negligent Building Inspections - Demise of the Public Duty
Doctrine?, 65 IowA L. REv. 1416, 1439-40 (1980).
199. See H. MILLER, supra note 60, at 8.
200. See Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co., 155 Cal. App. 3d 405, 205 Cal. Rptr 1 (1984).
201.
See Young, Tort Judgments Against Cities: The Sky's the Limit, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1509 (1983)
(article by Mayor of City of Detroit addressed to members of the Bar).
202. See Little, supra note 11, at 661; Young, supra note 201, at 1509 ("Modern juries seem
to have the impression that municipalities have access to a bottomless pot of gold .... ).
203. See Stone & Rinker, supra note 134, at 341; Note, supra note 134, at 344-45. Cf. Wilson
v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 674 (Iowa 1979) (financial consequences of legislation are the responsibility of the legislature).
204. W. PROSSER, LAW OF To.Ts 325-26 (4th ed. 1971) (" 'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself,

but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to
say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection").
205. See Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 925 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting); Stone & Rinker, supra note 196,
at 328.

206.

See Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).
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either statutory or judicial limitations on governmental liability. 2 7 The primary
limitations utilized are the public duty doctrine and the operational-discretionary
dichotomy. Once considered rejected in Florida, the role of the public duty
doctrine in municipal liability is now unclear after Trianon. The Trianon court
also considered the operational-discretionary distinction a shield to municipal
liability for negligent inspection; however, this position is disputable.208 This
section will examine other available means of limiting liability.
A.

Limiting Liability Through Proximate Cause

In Jones v. City of Longwood,2 09 the city escaped liability for negligently failing
to inspect an abandoned building due to a lack of proximate cause. In Jones,
a twelve-year-old child playing in an abandoned building was killed when a
2,000 pound cabinet fell on her. A local ordinance directed the building official
to periodically inspect all buildings and to report any unsafe conditions to the
city council. In a pre-Trianon decision, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal
conceded that building inspection was an operational activity for which the city
enjoyed no immunity. However, the court held that, as a matter of law, the
failure of the city to inspect and uncover the dangerous condition was not the
proximate cause of the child's death. The court reasoned that the building
official's inspection and subsequent report to the city council was only the first
210
step in the chain of events which would lead the city to condemn the property.
The dissent viewed the court's holding as merely an excuse to extend sovereign
21
immunity. 1
Other Florida courts have addressed the proximate cause issue indirectly.
The Third District Court of Appeal in Trianon raised the issue in the question
it certified to the Florida Supreme Court by limiting the question of liability
to a situation where the municipality plays no part in the actual construction
of the building. 2 2 By framing the question in this manner, the court suggested
that perhaps the city may not have been sufficiently involved in -the undertaking
to warrant a finding of legal causation. Justice McDonald, in his concurring
opinion in Trianon, also suggested a weak causal connection existed in negligent
building inspection cases. Justice McDonald indicated that governments should
213
not be liable where they did not directly cause the harm.
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal raised the issue more directly in
Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste, Inc. 214 In Neumann, the district court held that
the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) was not liable for negli-

207. H. MILLER, supra note 60, at 2.
208. See supra notes 110-20, 124-43 and accompanying text.
209. 404 So. 2d 1083, 1085 (5th D.C.A. 1981), pet. for rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1982).
210. 404 So. 2d at 1086.
211. Id.
212. 423 So. 2d at 914-15 ("Whether, ... a municipality retains its sovereign immunity from
a suit predicating liability solely upon the allegedly negligent inspection of a building, where the
municipality played no part in the actual construction of the building.").
213. Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 923.
214. 433 So. 2d 559 (2d D.C.A.), pet. for rev. denied, 441 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1983).
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gently failing to inspect a sewage treatment tank in which a three-year-old child
drowned. Although DER required the area to be fenced, the area was not
inspected to ascertain whether the required fencing was in place. Declining to
label DER's activity as either operational or discretionary, the court held that
DER's actions were protected by sovereign immunity. To justify its conclusion,
the court stated that DER did not design, construct, own, operate or maintain
the sewage treatment plant. The court concluded that the accident was not
2 15
caused by a "direct" operational act of the government.
Both the Trianon and Neumann decisions suggest an essential difference between government inspection activities and other types of government activities.
When the government engages in highway maintenance or traffic regulation,
the government is providing a direct service and thus undertakes a primary
duty to use reasonable care in its actions. However, when the government
undertakes inspection responsibilities, the government is merely supplementing
another's primary duty. The government's duty is only secondary. 2 6 Before a
government inspection activity can be labeled the proximate cause of an injury,
the government's conduct must have contributed to the cause of the injury in
some positive way. 217 .
Federal courts have dealt with the proximate cause issue in government
inspections by relying on the Good Samaritan doctrine as codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, sections 323 and 324A.2 1" Before a Good Samaritan
may be held liable for nelgigent performarice of an undertaking, he must have
contributed to the injury either by: (i) undertaking to perform the duty that
another person owes to a third party; (ii) increasing the risk of harm; or (iii)
inducing reliance on his undertaking. Only when the requirements of the Restatement are met does negligent inspection contribute to subsequent injuries
sufficiently to warrant a finding of proximate cause.

215. 433 So. 2d at 563; see also Johnson v. Collier County, 468 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1985) (the county did not design, construct, own, operate, or maintain the cause of the

injury).
216. See Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 1979); Dufrene v.
Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App.
22, 25, 509 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1973). See, e.g., Rayford v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 1051 (M.D.

Tenn. 1976).
217. Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1199 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
218. Section 324A of the Restatement provides:
Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking.
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the
undertaking.

RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). Cf id. § 323 (applying where one person undertakes
to render a service directly to another person).
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In Blessing v. United States 19 the United States District Court of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that the first condition which would trigger liability
under the Good Samaritan doctrine was inapplicable to federal OSHA inspections. The court held that since OSHA inspections do not replace the duty that
employers owe to their employees, the government does not undertake to perform the duty that another person owes to a third party. 220 The second condition
has been held applicable to federal regulatory inspections. Where government
inspections have increased the risk of harm, courts have not been hesitant to
22
impose liability. '
However, the third condition, inducing reliance, has proven more troublesome. Cash v. United States222 involved a claim against the Farmers Home Administration (FMHA) for negligently inspecting the construction of a home financed
by a FMHA loan. Without resolving the issue of whether this type of inspection
is operational or discretionary, the United States District Court of the Northern
District of Georgia held that FMHA could not be liable for negligence to the
homeowner-borrower. The court based its decision on regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture. The regulations provided that the borrower is
responsible for making inspections to protect the borrower's interest. The regulation further provided that FMHA inspections are not to assure the borrower
that the house is built in accordance with plans and specifications. The court
reasoned that the regulations precluded the borrower from relying on FMHA
inspections. Consequently, the court concluded that the Good Samaritan doctrine was inapplicable.

22

1

Under the Good Samaritan doctrine, regulatory disclaimers such as the regulation relied upon in Cash could limit government inspection liability to situations where the government inspection increased the risk of harm. However,
boilerplate disclaimers create an artificial barrier to liability. 22 4 While the party

with the primary duty to render the service may not be entitled to rely on
regulatory inspections, whether other parties relied is a question of fact. 225 Al-

though standard building codes provide that the owner has primary responsibility for code compliance, the public has come to rely on the issuance of a
certificate of occupancy as evidence that the building meets minimum standards.

219.

447 F. Supp. 1160, 1199 (E.D. Pa. 1978).

220. Id. at 1194.
221.
See Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206, 1213-17 (7th Cir. 1983) (federal mine inspection increased the risk of injury to workers and was thus the proximate cause of miner's death).
222. 571 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

223.

Id. at 515.

224.

See Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1983). In Hylin, the mining

regulation provided, "the operators of such mines with the assistance of the miners have the primary
responsibility to prevent the existence of such unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices in
such mines." The government claimed that this language precluded either the operators or the
miners from relying on government inspections. The court questioned the effectiveness of such
disclaimers and found the government liable on other grounds. Id.
225. See Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1200 n.56 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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Other Limits on Liability

As the trend to abrogate sovereign immunity continues and more states
reject the public duty doctrine, legislation has begun to limit municipal liability.
Some states, including Florida., limit the monetary amount recoverable from a
governmental entity. 226 Many states also limit the types of damages recoverable.
227
Florida Statutes section 768.28 allows all types of damages except punitive.
The Manors dissent suggested that municipalities should only be liable for
injuries resulting from defective construction. 228 Traditionally, courts have been
more willing to find a governmental entity liable for negligent inspection when
personal injury was involved. 229 This result is justified since the primary purpose
of building codes is to protect the health and safety of building occupants, not
to protect the monetary interests of individuals.
Modern English law is based on principles similar to those proposed in
Judge Anstead's dissent in Manors. In England, local authorities may be held
liable for negligent building inspection; however, damages are limited to the
cost of removing a present or imminent danger. 230 A homeowner cannot recover
from the local government merely because the building is less valuable than it
should be. Based on statutory interpretation, English courts have held that the
duty of the building authorities extends only to ensuring the occupier's safety,
not to protecting the building owner's financial interests. 23 1 This approach focuses the building authorities' concern on safety and leaves quality control to
the private sector.
Another method by which municipal liability can be curbed is by placing
limitations on contribution claims. An Alabama statute ensures that a government entity will not bear the entire burden of joint tortious conduct.2 32 The
Alabama statute provides that, in a tort action where a government entity is
a defendant, the plaintiff must join others who may be potentially liable. A
judgment against the other co-defendants is required before a judgment against
the municipality will be allowed. The municipality will only be required to pay
what cannot be collected from the other co-defendants. 2 33 This type of legislation
deters plaintiffs from bringing frivolous suits against municipalities. In the construction litigation context, such legislation would reduce the number of cross-

226. See supra note 66. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-93-2 (Supp. 1984) ($100,000 per person in
any one occurrence); R.I. GEN. LAws 5 9-31-2 (Supp. 1984) ($100,000 limit, effective Jan. 1,

1985).
See supra note 65. Cf. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44.070(1) (Baldwin 1980) (no recovery for
suffering).
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 18, at 474.
See Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [19781 A.C. 728.
Id. at 758, 759. See generalol Grubb, A Case for Recognizing Economic Loss in Defective Building
Cases, 43(1) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 111 (Apr. 1984).
227.
pain and
228.
229.
230.
231.

232.

ALA. CODE §

11-47-191 (1975).

233.

The Alabama Code provides in part:
(b) When a judgment shall be obtained against a municipality and the other party
liable as provided in subsection (a) of this section, execution shall issue against the other
defendant or defendants in the ordinary form and shall not be demandable of the city or
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claims filed against municipalities and would keep the burden of defective construction on the private sector. However, if the developer or other responsible
parties are insolvent, the plaintiff would not be left without a remedy.
Six states which have enacted broad waivers of sovereign immunity have
elected to specifically except liability stemming from negligent inspection. 2 4 Generally, these statutes provide that a public entity is not liable for any injury
caused by its failure to make an inspection or due to an inadequate or negligent
inspection. 235 Exceptions of this type represent a policy decision to encourage
rather than discourage government inspection activities. Additionally, this type
of legislation is based on a recognition of the extensive nature of government
inspection acitivities and the potential for excessive governmental liability. 36
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the end result of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Trianon is
consistent with public policy in the narrow area of negligent building inspection,
the court's departure from previous holdings has made sovereign immunity the
rule rather than the exception. Rather than considering new ways to limit
municipal liability, the supreme court chose to readopt the public duty doctrine
and the governmental-proprietary distinction. These theories have historically
proven to be harsh and difficult to apply. Additionally, the Trianon decision
exacerbated the confusion of municipal liability by adding four categories of
government activity; lower courts must now sift through these categories before
applying the much criticized four-prong test of Commercial Carrier.
The supreme court's reversal of Trianon has also prevented Florida municipalities from becoming joint insurers of the quality of construction. Although

town unless the other defendants are insolvent and the same cannot be made out of their
property, and the city or town shall pay only so much of the said judgment as cannot
be collected from the other defendants.
Id.
234. ALAsA STAT. § 09.65-070(d)(1)(A) (1983) (applies only to incorporated units of local
government); CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 818.4 (West 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3 (Bums Supp.
1982); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.033 (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. 5 59:2-6 (West 1982); UTAH CODE
ANN. 5 63-30-10(1)(c) (Supp. 1983).
235. N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 59:2-6 (West 1982) ("A public entity is not liable for injury caused
by its failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection
of any property .... ).
236. The official comment to New Jersey's provision on negligent inspection states: "This
immunity is essential in light of the potential and existing inspection activities engaged in by public
entities for the benefit of the public generally. These activities are to be encouraged rather than
discouraged .... " Id. Cf. FLA. STAT. 5 325.29 (1980) ("No inspector or inspection station inspecting
a motor vehicle and insuring an inspection certificate of such inspection ... shall be liable in damages
for any defect in or failure or improper functioning of any item of equipment on such motor
vehicle occurring subsequent to such inspection.") (repealed 1981). See also Betancourt v. Metropolitan Dade County, 393 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (statute exempting car inspection
stations from liability for negligent inspection may coexist with statute waiving sovereign immunity);
Hensley v. Seminole County, 268 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1972) ("It would inhibit, if
not destroy, the inspection program if each post inspection vehicular defect furnished a predicate
for suing the government.").
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the construction industry would be precluded from shifting the entire burden
of construction defects onto municipalities, but for sovereign immunity, developers and other construction defendants would be able to shift a portion of
their loss. However, sovereign immunity is not the only avenue to limit municipal liability.
The proximate cause analysis of the Good Samaritan doctrine, as applied
by federal courts, is one such solution. Accordingly, a developer charged with
a primary duty to comply with building codes cannot justifiably rely on the
city to perform that duty. By applying the Good Samaritan doctrine, the developer could maintain a direct action against the city only if the building
inspection increased the risk of harm.
Further limits on liability could be obtained by adoption of an Alabamatype statute which places limits on contribution claims against municipalities.
The statute could be limited to apply only to municipal inspection duties where
private parties have the primary responsibility for performing the service. Thus,
where the municipality's duty is only secondary, the private sector would bear
the burden of construction defects.
LAURA ROBINSON
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